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A. Scope of Investigation 
 The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (“Department”), Pipeline 
Engineering and Safety Division (“Division”), pursuant to G.L. c. 164, § 105A and a Federal 
Certification Agreement as provided for in 49 U.S.C. § 60105, has investigated a natural gas 
(“gas”) release at 93 New York Avenue, Somerset, Massachusetts on February 19, 2009 
(“Incident”).1  The release of gas contributed to an explosion, fire and over $1,000,000          
in property damage to the dwelling, as estimated by the Somerset Fire Department (Exh. 2). 
The operator of the natural gas facilities at the Incident is New England Gas Company 
(“NEGC” or “Operator”).  There was one fatality as a result of the explosion. 
 As part of the Department’s annual certification process by the United States 
Department of Transportation (“U.S. DOT”), the Department must report to the U.S. DOT 
each accident or incident . . . involving a fatality, personal injury requiring 
hospitalization, or property damage or loss of more than an amount the 
Secretary establishes… and any other accident the [Department] considers  
significant, and a summary of the investigation by the [Department] of the cause 
and circumstances surrounding the accident or incident.  49 U.S.C. § 60105(c).   
 
The purpose of this report is to inform the U.S. DOT as to the cause and circumstances 
surrounding the Incident. 
                                           
1  Incident means any of the following events: 
1. An event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline or liquefied natural gas or 
gas from an LNG facility and, 
a. A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization; or 
b. Estimated property damage, including cost of gas lost, of the operator or 
others, or both, of $50,000 or more. 
2. An event that results in an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility. 
3. An event that is significant in the judgment of the operator, even though it did not 
meet the criteria of paragraphs (1) or (2).  49 C.F.R. Part 191, § 191.3. 
 




The Department has established procedures for determining the nature and extent of 
violations of codes and regulations pertaining to the safety of pipeline facilities and the 
transportation of gas, including but not limited to, 220 C.M.R. §§ 101.00 through 113.00.  
See 220 C.M.R. § 69.00 et  seq.  The Division also enforces the U.S. DOT safety standards 
for gas pipeline systems as set forth in 49 C.F.R. Part 192 (“Part 192").  
G.L. c. 164, § 105A. 
B. Overview of Incident 
On February 19, 2009, at 5:16 p.m., the Somerset Fire Department (“Somerset FD”) 
reported to NEGC a strong smell of gas at 30 New York Avenue, Somerset Massachusetts 
(Exh. 1).  At 5:25 p.m. NEGC dispatched a service technician (id.).  Several members of the 
Somerset FD were on site (id.).  The service technician stated that he arrived at the scene at 
approximately 5:40 p.m. (id.).  At 5:50 p.m., a Company supervisor and a second service 
technician arrived (id.)  At approximately 6:15 p.m., an explosion occurred at 93 New York 
Avenue (id.).   
The Somerset FD stated that the building at 93 New York Avenue was on fire and 
completely leveled (Exh. 2).  The Somerset FD estimated the property damage to 93 New 
York Avenue to be $1,000,000, and the contents loss to be $100,000 (id.).  Three other homes 
sustained serious damage (id.). 
The Somerset FD stated that it found a deceased woman lying in the Northwest corner 
of the debris at 93 New York Avenue (id.).  Two firefighters suffered minor injuries, and the 
Somerset FD recovered a deceased small dog in the neighboring yard (id.). 




The Pipeline Engineering and Safety Division (“Pipeline Division”) of the Department 
of Public Utilities (“Department”) sent two investigators to the scene. 
II. THE DEPARTMENT’S INVESTIGATION 
A. Description of the Site 
New York Avenue is located in a residential area of Somerset, Massachusetts.  The 
structure at 93 New York Avenue was a five room single-family home with a poured concrete 
foundation (Exh. 3).  The house was built in 1965, and had a total inside finished area of 1,120 
square feet (id.)  The lot size is 0.22 acres (id.). 
Photos of the foundation taken after the incident, show that it was cracked in some 
places (id.).  Although the Somerset Assessor’s property card for 93 New York Avenue 
indicates sewer and water service, there is no record from the Somerset Water and Sewer 
Department that 93 New York Avenue was connected to the Somerset sewer system (id.).  The 
house was connected to town water service (id.).  
B. Emergency Response 
 At 5:25 p.m., NEGC dispatched a service technician to 30 New York Avenue (Exh. 1). 
The service technician arrived at the scene at approximately 5:40 p.m. (id.).  At  
5:50 p.m., a Company supervisor and a second service technician arrived (id.).  The three 
NECG personnel detected gas blowing from a crack or cracks in the pavement in the area in 
front of 73 New York New York Avenue (id.).     
 One of the NEGC emergency responders proceeded to check in front of houses for gas 
using bar holes (id.).  NEGC stated that its emergency responder placed three bar holes outside 




the foundations of 93 and 73 New York Avenue (id.).  NEGC reported negative readings for 
the presence of gas in these areas (id.).     
 NEGC reported that its emergency responder knocked on the doors of 73 and 93 New 
York Avenue and no one responded (id.).  NEGC reported that at 6:15 p.m., an explosion 
occurred at 93 New York Avenue (id.).2  The three leak responders assisted evacuation of 
nearby homes (id.).  
 In order to isolate the leaking section of pipe, NEGC turned off the gas main valve at 
the corner of New York and Reagan Road at approximately 6:30 (id.).  NEGC turned off the 
valve at the corner of New York and Rounseville at approximately 7:15 p.m. (id.).  
C. Drug and Alcohol Testing Report 
NEGC stated that there was no evidence or indication that any of the Company’s three 
employees who responded to the odor report on New York Avenue caused or contributed to 
the cause of the incident (Exh. 4).  As such, NEGC reported that it did not require any of its 
employees to undergo drug and alcohol tests (id.). 
D. 93 New York Avenue 
1. Service Installation and Description 
Records indicate that NEGC installed a one-inch coated steel service line to 93 New 
York Avenue on September 30, 1964 (Exh. 5).  The customer meter was inside the basement. 
NEGC reported that it buried the service line three feet deep (id.).  The service line 
extended 29.5 feet from the house to the curb, and another twelve feet under New York 
Avenue to the gas main (id.).  
                                           
2  Across the street from 72 New York Avenue is 73 New York Avenue (Exh. 13). The 
lot next to 73 New York Avenue and to its west, is 93 New York Avenue (id.). 




2. Leak Survey and Repair Records for 93 New York Avenue 
The Operator presented records indicating that, on June 14, 2005, and May 20, 2008, 
NEGC conducted leak surveys and corrosion inspections of the service to 93 New York 
Avenue (Exh. 6).  The Operator determined that there were no leaks, and that the service pipe 
was in good condition (id.).   
E. The Gas Main Under New York Avenue 
1. Description of the Main Under New York Avenue 
The Operator installed a two inch coated steel gas main3 underlying New York Avenue 
in October, 1964 (Exh. 7).  The maximum operating pressure (“MAOP”)4 of the main is 60 
pounds per square inch gauge (“PSIG”) (id.).5  NEGC reported that operating pressure of the 
main at the time of the Incident was 49.5 PSIG (id.).    
2. Description of the Damaged Main 
 NEGC recovered a piece of the two-inch coated steel main from in front of 72 New 
York Avenue (Exh. 8).  The piece was approximately 50 inches long, and wrapped on the 
outside with a yellow coating (id.).  The pipe was bent, and the coating was torn in a number 
                                           
3  A main is a distribution line that serves as a common source supply for more than one     
service line.  Part 192, § 192.3. 
4  MAOP means the maximum pressure at which a pipeline or segment of a pipeline may 
be operated.  Part 192 § 192.621. 
5  PSIG refers to the pressure expressed in pounds exerted on one square inch of surface 
area. The designation “gauge,” indicates the readings are already adjusted to ignore the 
surrounding atmospheric pressure, which is 14.7 psi at sea level.  If psig gauge were 
not connected to any pressure source, it would read zero even though it is actually 
sensing 14.7 psi at sea level. 




of places (id.).  The pipe had a semi-circumferential crack at one of the areas where the yellow 
coating was torn off (id.). 
3. History of Repairs on the Main 
On March 26, 1974, NEGC repaired a section of the New York Avenue main in front 
of 90 New York Avenue (Exh. 7; see Exh. 11).  On March 23, 1985, NEGC repaired a 
cracked main approximately twenty-five (25) feet east of 10 New York Avenue (Exh. 7).  The 
Operator reported no leak repairs on New York Avenue from February 19, 2004 to 
February 19, 2009 (id.).     
4. Leakage Surveys on the Main and Services after the Incident 
Following the Incident, on February 19, 2009, the Operator shut off the gas on New 
York Avenue from Rounseville Avenue to Regan Road (Exh. 9).  Prior to shutting the gas off, 
the Operator reported a reading of 100 percent gas above the main in front of 72 New York 
Avenue (id.).  NEGC cut off and capped a 200 foot section of the main in front of 72 New 
York Avenue (id.).  
The Operator performed leak surveys on all mains and services on Rhode Island 
Avenue and Eastern Avenue (id.).  NEGC found no leaks (id.). 
On February 20, 2009, the Operator pressure tested the main and services on the east 
and west sections of New York Avenue, at 72 pounds, for one hour (id.).  The main and 
services held the pressure (id.).  The operator restored gas service to the area (id.).     
5. Replacement of the Main following the Incident 
 On February 20, 2009, the Operator isolated an approximately 200-foot section of the 
New York Avenue gas main (id.).  NEGC removed an approximately 50-inch section of the 




main that was damaged described above (id.).  On March 23, 2009, NECG installed 197 feet 
of two-inch plastic main in the public way from 72 to 110 New York Avenue (id.).  The 
Operator also installed a one-half inch service pipe to 90 New York Avenue (id.). 
6. Odor Testing 
The state regulation, 220 C.M.R. § 101.06(20), requires operators to odorize gas in 
their distribution systems.  Gas must be “readily perceptible to the normal or average olfactory 
senses of a person coming from fresh uncontaminated air into a closed room containing 0.15 
percent gas and air.” Id.  The state regulation, 220 C.M.R. § 101.06(20)(a), requires operators 
to conduct periodic sampling of odorant concentrations throughout their system.  
On January 13, 2009, the operator conducted an odor level test in Somerset, on 
Kenmar Drive (Exh. 10).  On February 19, 2009 the operator conducted seven odorant tests, 
following the incident (id.).  The results of the tests are as follows: 
January 13, 2009 
 
Kenmar Drive, Somerset – 12:33:48 -  TDL Result  0.06% 
         RDL Result  0.10%6 
 
February 19, 2009 
 
County Street, Somerset Plaza – 19:54:36 - TDL Result   0.07%   
RDL Result  0.09% 
County Street, Somerset Plaza – 20:02:29 – TDL Result  0.07% 
                                                              RDL Result  0.07% 
County Street, Somerset Plaza – 20:04:10 – TDL Result  0.03% 
       RDL Result  0.06% 
Whetstone School                     20:12:03 - TDL Result  0.05% 
       RDL Result  0.11% 
Whetstone School       20:17:23   TDL Result  0.07% 
      RDL Result  0.09% 
                                           
6  TDL means Threshold Detection Level, RDL means Readily Detectable Level. 




Chace School                           20:27:28    TDL Result  0.03% 
       RDL Result  0.06% 
Chace School        20:28:48    TDL Result  0.03% 
       RDL Result  0.06% 
(id.). 
The odor detect ability levels of gas in air ranged from 0.03 percent to 0.11 percent gas 
in air, indicating that the odorant levels were within the limit prescribed in the state regulation.  
The odorant levels also met the federal pipeline safety requirement, contained in 
Part 192, § 192.625, which requires that gas be odorized so that it can be detected at a level of 
one percent gas in air.  
7. Sewer Installation on New York Avenue  
The Town of Somerset (“Town”) informed the Operator that, during a sewer main 
installation on New York Avenue in 1974, the Town’s contractor also installed laterals, or 
stubs, from the sewer main to the edge of the right-of-way (Exh. 11).  The plan provided by 
the Town indicates that one of these sewer laterals passes under the section of the gas main that 
failed, and was recovered from the Incident (id.).    
On or about March 25, 1974, the Town’s records on the sewer main installation notes a 
broken gas main in front of 90 New York Avenue (Exh. 11, see Exh. 7).  The Town’s record 
also notes “foreign pipe . . . three-inch gas,” buried at a depth of 2.8 feet in front of 72 New 
York Avenue (Exh. 11).  The Town’s records also indicate that the elevation of the street rises 
from 72 New York Avenue to 93 New York Avenue (id.). 
The plan for the Town’s 1974 sewer project illustrates a 19.5 foot sewer pipe lateral 
that extends from the sewer pipe under New York Avenue to under the curb in front of 72 
New York Avenue (id.).  The plan demonstrates that the lateral sewer pipe crossed under the 




NEGC coated steel main in approximately the southwest corner of 72 New York Avenue (id.).  
The plan notes that depth of this sewer lateral, apparently where the pipe meets the property 
line of 72 New York Avenue, is 7.7 feet (id.).   
On September 30, 1964, NEGC reported that the depth of the gas main in front of 
72 New York Avenue was three feet (Exh. 12).  In 1974, the Town reported that the depth of 
the “foreign” gas pipe it encountered in front of 72 New York Avenue was 2.8 feet (Exh. 11). 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PIPE SEGMENT 
Altran Solutions (“Altran”) performed the analysis of a cracked segment of two inch 
coated steel main underlying New York Avenue.  On October 26, 2010, Altran issued a report 
on the results of the analysis (“Altran Report”).7  The Report finds the following. 
 The pipe section was deformed by bending in situ. Damage to the plastic 
coating and pipe indicate the force to bend the pipe was applied at 
approximately the 9 O’clock position. The pipe deflection was measured 
to be 0.48 inches over a length of 49 inches. 
 Corrosion was noted under the plastic coating in the area of the fracture. 
The plastic coating was found loosely adhered to the pipe wall. 
 Physical measurements taken did not show any inconsistencies within the 
pipe section. Except for the area of deformation noted in the 9 O’clock 
position. 
 Non destructive testing confirmed the extent of the cracking and did not 
detect any other cracks. 
 The visual and SEM examinations of the fracture surface of the east side 
revealed a cleavage (brittle) type fracture around the entire 
circumference, although some locations were mostly obscured due to 
corrosion and/or rubbing damage.  
(Altran Report at 19). 
                                           
7  Copies of the Altran Report may be obtained by contacting Van Christie, at Altran 
Solutions, 451 D Street, Boston, MA  02210, (617) 204-1011. 




The Altran Report concludes that:  
Based on the results of laboratory tests allowed by the agreed upon 
protocol, it is concluded that the subject pipe cracked in brittle fashion, 
which is evident by the cleavage (brittle) morphology exhibited by the 
fracture surface. The likely cause for the failure was the bending of the 
pipe and local damage noted at the 9 O’clock location. This localized 
damage caused initial cracking of the pipe wall, which did not propagate 
through wall.  Although it is not clear how far around the circumference 
the crack initially propagated, it is clear it later grew around almost the 
entire pipe circumference, leaving only the small ligament noted at the 
12:30 to 3:00 O’clock positions intact. This small ligament also 
failed in a brittle manner during the pipe separation in the laboratory, 
confirming the lack of ductility exhibited by the pipe material. 
 
Of particular interest is the fact that the cleavage (brittle) features 
exhibited less damage along the ID wall, even in the most corroded 
locations. This indicates the cracking likely initiated at the OD of the 
pipe wall at the 8 - 10 O’clock position, where the deformation of the 
pipe wall was present and the bending was prominent. The crack then 
propagated toward the ID wall but did not crack entirely though wall. 
The examinations showed the ID edge of the pipe wall was the last to 
crack, and hence the fracture surface is relatively newer as compared 
with the rest of the fracture. It is unknown what specific event caused the 
remaining portion to crack and the final failure to occur. 
 
In summary, it is concluded that the pipe fracture initiated in the location 
of observed local damage, and over time, propagated through wall and 
around the perimeter. The pipe material itself may also have low 
ductility, which would likely facilitate the propagation of the crack. This 
low ductility is most likely a property of the pipe and not due to 
environmental conditions that could have embrittled the material. 
However, this cannot be confirmed without further testing of the pipe 
material. 
 
(id. at 19-20). 
 




IV. FINDINGS  
A. The Incident 
1. On February 19, 2009, at 5:16 p.m., the Somerset Fire Department 
reported to NEGC a strong smell of gas at 30 New York Avenue, 
Somerset Massachusetts.  
2. At 5:25 p.m., NEGC dispatched a service technician to 30 New York 
Avenue.  
3. Members of the Somerset Fire Department were present when the 
service technician arrived at the scene at approximately 5:40 p.m., and 
requested a crew. 
4. At 5:50 p.m., NEGC reported that a Company supervisor and a second 
service technician arrived.  
5. Three NECG personnel detected gas blowing from a crack or cracks in 
the pavement in the area in front of 73 New York Avenue. 
6. Prior to the Incident, NEGC reported negative readings for the presence 
of gas outside the foundations of 93 and 73 New York Avenue.     
7. Prior to the Incident, NEGC reported that its emergency responder 
knocked on the doors of 73 and 93 New York Avenue and no one 
responded.  
8. NEGC reported that at approximately 6:15 p.m., an explosion occurred 
at 93 New York Avenue.  
9. The Somerset Fire Department estimated the property damage to 93 New 
York Avenue to be $1,000,000, and the contents loss to be $100,000. 
Three other homes sustained serious damage.   
10. The Somerset Fire Department found a deceased woman lying in the 
Northwest corner of the debris at 93 New York Avenue.  
B. The Gas Main Under New York Avenue  
1. NEGC installed a two inch coated steel gas main beneath New York 
Avenue in October, 1964.   
2. On September 30, 1964, NEGC reported that the depth of the gas main 
in front of 72 New York Avenue was three feet. 




3. On March 26, 1974, NEGC repaired a section of the New York Avenue 
main in front of 90 New York Avenue.   
4. On March 23, 1985, NEGC repaired a cracked main approximately 
twenty-five (25) feet east of 10 New York Avenue. 
5. The MAOP of the main is 60 PSIG. 
6. The operating pressure of the main at the time of the Incident was 49.5 
PSIG. 
C. The Recovered Pipe 
1. Following the incident, NEGC removed an approximately 50 inch 
section of coated steel main from under the street in front of 72 New 
York Avenue. 
2. The piece of main was wrapped on the outside with a yellow coating.    
3. The pipe was bent, and the yellow outside coating was torn in a number 
of places.   
4. The pipe had a semi-circumferential crack at one of the areas where the 
yellow coating was torn off. 
5. Altran measured the bend in the pipe to be 0.48 inches over a length of 
49 inches. 
6. The Altran Report’s findings that the likely causes for the failure of the 
pipe were the bending of the pipe, and local damage located at the 9 
O’clock position, are reasonable.   
D. The Sewer Installation under New York Avenue 
1. During a sewer main installation on NY Avenue in 1974, the Town’s 
contractor installed laterals from the sewer main to the edge of the   
right-of-way on New York Avenue.  
2. On or about March 25, 1974, the Town’s records on the sewer main 
installation notes a broken gas main in front of 90 New York Avenue. 
3. The same record notes that the depth of “foreign” gas pipe it 
encountered in front of 72 New York Avenue was 2.8 feet. 




4. The plan for the Town’s 1974 sewer project illustrates a 19.5 foot sewer 
lateral that extends from the main sewer pipe under New York Avenue, 
to under the curb in front of 72 New York Avenue.  
5. The plan demonstrates that the sewer lateral crossed the NEGC coated 
steel main in approximately the southwest corner of 72 New York 
Avenue.   
6. The sewer lateral passes under the section of the damaged gas main that 
was recovered in front of 72 New York Avenue. 
7. The plan notes that depth of this sewer lateral, apparently where the pipe 
meets the property line of 72 New York Avenue, is 7.7 feet.  
E. The Service to 93 New York Avenue 
1. The service line to New York Avenue extended 29.5 feet from the house 
to the curb, and another twelve feet under New York Avenue, to the gas 
main. 
2. On June 14, 2005 and May 20, 2008, NEGC conducted leak surveys and 
corrosion inspections of the service to 93 New York Avenue.   
3. During those visits, the Operator determined that there were no leaks, 
and that the service pipe was in good condition.   
4. Following the incident, NEGC pressure tested the service line to 93 New 
York Avenue and the line held pressure. 
F. The House at 93 New York Avenue 
1. The structure at 93 New York Avenue was a five room single-family 
home with a poured concrete foundation.  
2. The house was built in 1965, and has a total inside finished area of 1120 
square feet.   
3. The lot size is 0.22 acres. 
4. A lateral from the sewer line runs to the property line of 93 New York 
Avenue.   
5. The Town of Somerset property card for 93 New York Avenue states 
that the residence was connected up to the town’s sewer line and water 
service.   




6. The Town of Somerset’s Water and Sewer Department has no record 
that 93 New York Avenue was tied into the town’s sewer system. 
7. The structure at 93 New York Avenue was tied into the Town of 
Somerset water system.   
G. The Release of Gas from the Broken Pipe 
1. The source of the release of gas was the cracked pipe recovered from the 
main under the street in front of 72 New York Avenue.   
2. Prior to the incident, NEGC detected 100 percent gas above the main in 
front of 72 New York Avenue.   
3. Prior to the incident, the NECG technician did not report any gas 
readings outside the foundation of 93 New York Avenue. 
4. The residence at 93 New York Avenue had natural gas service. 
5. The foundation to the house was cracked in a number of locations.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The crack in the damaged main recovered from the street in front of 72 New York 
Avenue was the source of the release of gas.  The released gas entered 93 New York Avenue 
accumulated, and was ignited by an undetermined source.  The Pipeline Division is unable to 
ascertain the path of the gas from the broken main to the basement of 93 New York Avenue. 
The findings and conclusions in the Altran Report are reasonable, and based upon 
substantial and specific evidence.  
The damage to the yellow coating on the pipe, and the bend in main, was caused by a 
third party.  The excavator installing the sewer and sewer laterals under New York Avenue in 
1974 may have damaged the coating and pipe.  The NEGC repairs to the main under New 
York Avenue in 1974 in front of 90 New York  Avenue were most likely too far away to have 
exposed the damaged pipe recovered from the street in front of 72 New York Avenue.  




Similarly, the NECG repairs to the main located in front of 10 New York Avenue in 1985 
were most likely too far away to have exposed the damaged the pipe recovered from the street 
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